A Client’s Right To Access Clinical Records: 2004 Update
George K. Bryce, BCACC legal counsel
December 14, 2004
INTRODUCTION
In the Spring and Summer 2003 issues of Insight, I wrote a two-part article on a client’s right to access clinical records (see part 1 @15:1 Insights at pages 13 & 14, and part 2 @ 15:2 Insights at pages 12, 24 & 25). In January 2004, the new Personal Information Protection Act ("PIPA") came into force, and I produced an overview of that new legislation in the Winter and Summer 2004 issues (see part 1 @15:3 Insights at page 14, 30 to 32, and part 2 @ 16:1 Insights at pages 13, 31 to 33).
As I noted in the 2003 article, in the landmark case of McInerney v. MacDonald 1 the Supreme Court of Canada distinguished between a client’s personal information and the way that a health care practitioner records or stores that information. The court went on to find that in effect the client "owns" his or her personal information, and the practitioner owns the way that that information has been recorded or stored. Therefore, in order to allow a client to act on his or her ownership rights over his or her personal information, the court ruled that a practitioner must allow a client to have reasonable access to the clinical records or other ways that the client’s information was stored. After making that decision, the court went on to comment that a practitioner can only deny a client access to his or her information in particular and very narrow circumstances. (These legal principles are reflected in the BCACC Code of Ethical Conduct and Standards of Clinical Practice, although the Code uses somewhat different language than that found in the SCC decision.)
As I noted in the recent overview of PIPA, this new legislation requires a counsellor or a counselling agency to provide a client with his or her personal information that is under the counsellor’s or the agency’s control. (Herein I will refer to a counsellor alone, but this should be understood to apply also to an agency in the private sector.) The new legislation does not, however, go further and specify the particular way that a counsellor must provide information to the client. As such, the general principles of access that I discussed in the 2003 article continue to apply. On the other hand, PIPA has now entrenched some of the common law exceptions to a client’s right of access and – to a certain extent – recast some of the guidance that was originally provided by the SCC in the McInerney case.
Given these refinements if not changes to the common law, I thought I would be useful to take review the 2003 article to see how client access to clinical records is now dealt with under PIPA. My review identified a need to update the 2003 version of the original client access article. Rather than publish a revised article in Insights, this update is being posted at the BCACC website to replace that earlier version.
PIPA REFINEMENTS TO THE PRACTICE QUESTIONS
As I noted in the two-part article on PIPA, Part 7 of the new Act contains a number of specific sections that speak to the rights of individuals to access and correct their personal information. The PIPA requirements do not repeal the common law principles (as set out by the SCC in the McInerney case and as reflected in the BCACC Code), but this new legislation does provides some new and further guidance to self-employed counsellors in private practice when they are faced with such requests.2
The easiest way to illustrate the PIPA refinements to the common law is to update the answers to the practice questions that were first addressed in the 2003 article, using the same headings, and to add a few new ones to that earlier list to cover subjects not originally addressed by the SCC.
1) What sort of access must a counsellor provide?
Section 23(1) of PIPA states that a counsellor must provide a client with his or her personal information that is under the practitioner’s control, explain how that information has or is being used, and identify to whom that information may have been disclosed to in the past. As I noted in the Introduction above, PIPA does not go further and specify the particular mechanisms that a counsellor must employ when providing that information to the client. For example, the new Act does not say that a counsellor must always allow a client to review the clinical records in a separate room at the counsellor’s office. As I discussed previously, the type of access the counsellor should provide for the requesting client will very much depend on how the counsellor recorded the client’s clinical information. I will have more to say about electronic records below, but in general terms the counsellor has two choices in terms of giving a client access to his or her personal information recorded in the clinical notes.
The first option would be for the counsellor to arrange to have the client come to the counsellor’s office (or wherever the counsellor keeps the clinical record) and simply let the client read the records in private, if that is possible or practical. The client should be allowed to make notes of the information that is recorded in the counsellor’s files.
The second option would be for the counsellor to make a duplicate copy of the clinical record and simply send that copy to the client at a given address.
A variation on these options would be to let the client identify the documents in the counsellor’s file that the client would like to have copied. The requested copying could be done during or immediately after the client’s review, or done later and the copies sent to the client. Obviously, the counsellor’s office arrangements and access to a photocopier will determine whether copying will happen at the time the client reviews the file or at some later date.
If the counsellor were concerned that a client may make changes to the clinical record, it would be advisable to provide the client with a copy of and not the original record. The PIPA allows a client to request corrections to his or her personal information, and I will have more to say about this later in this update.
Unless I differentiate between them in the rest of this update, the reader should read the term "access" as including "copying".
2) Can the counsellor charge the client a fee for accessing and copying the records?
In the 2003 article, I suggested that, while a counsellor could charge a fee for copying a client’s record, the counsellor should not charge a fee for only access. Section 32(2) of PIPA allows a counsellor to charge the client a "minimal" fee to access, search or copy the clinical records in question. This is a change from what was suggested by the common law. (I will have more to say on what constitutes a reasonable "minimal" fee below.) The bottom line is that the counsellor can now charge a client a fee for both accessing and copying the information that is in the clinical records.
3) Can the counsellor demand pre-payment of the access or copying fee?
Previously, I had indicated that it would probably be unethical for the counsellor to refuse to provide a client with access to or a copy of the record until the client paid those costs. I suggested that, if the client did not pay the copying fee, the counsellor’s best option would be to make the copies and later sue the client in small claims if the counsellor was not paid for that service. PIPA has changed this as well.
Section 32(3) of PIPA states that, before allowing access to personal information or making the requested copies of the clinical records containing that information, a counsellor who intends to charge a fee (which as I have noted above is permitted under section 32(2) of the Act), must give the client an estimate of those costs. If the client agrees (and the estimate is reasonable), this section goes on to say that the counsellor may then request the client give a deposit for all or part of the anticipated access/copying fee.
If the client refuses to give a deposit (and so long as the estimated cost is reasonable), section 32(3)(b) would appear to provide the counsellor with a legal basis to then refuse to provide access or make copies of the file.
PIPA goes further and requires the counsellor then take specific action. If the counsellor refuses to provide access pursuant to section 32(3)(b) because the client refuses to pay a deposit, the counsellor should communicate that decision in writing to the client, providing an explanation for the decision. In doing so, the counsellor should also point out that the client has the right to request a review of that decision pursuant to section 46(1) of the Act.
These are steps that should be documented in the counsellor’s policies and procedures manual which, as explained in the 2004 article on PIPA, is itself a requirement under the Act. To provide counsellors with some guidance on PIPA, the BCACC Board has approved in October 2004 A Counsellor’s Guide for Developing Client Personal Information Protection Policies and Procedures, a copy of which has been posted elsewhere at the Association website.
4) What sort of fee can the counsellor charge?
The PIPA does not set out a schedule of recommended fees concerning what constitutes a reasonable access or copying fee. As noted above, section 32(3) simply says that a counsellor may change the requesting client a "minimal fee" for access to his or her personal information recorded in the counsellor’s files.
While PIPA does not provide a fee schedule, it does provide a mechanism to allow a disgruntled client to appeal what the client believes is an unreasonable fee. I need not set out that mechanism here, except to point out that if a counsellor’s fee was found to be unreasonable in the circumstances, a lower fee could be ordered along with a refund to the client of the excess.
A Counsellor’s Guide for Developing Client Personal Information Protection Policies and Procedures proposes a PIPA fee schedule for counsellors to adopt in their own policy documents. This suggested fee schedule was derived from Schedule D, Maximum Fees for Information Requests, which was produced in the 2004 version of the Ministry of Health Services model college bylaws under the Health Professions Act. Therefore, I expect that, if a counsellor adopts those recommended fees and those fees were ever challenge, the Privacy Commission or any other reviewing authority would find that fee schedule to be reasonable.
5) Can the client access all their clinical records?
In 2003, I explained that, in order to answer this question, it was necessary to first determine what does and does not constitute part of the clinical record. PIPA does not speak to clinical records per se, instead it refers to personal information, regardless of how it is collected or recorded by the counsellor. As such, under PIPA, the client can access any personal information the counsellor collects from the client, regardless of how it was recorded or stored, subject to certain specific statutory exceptions.
I will have more to say about the PIPA exceptions later. But next I will consider a client request for access to personal information about the client that may have been provided by third parties, with or without the client’s knowledge or consent.
6) What if the information in the clinical record contains sensitive or confidential information about the client that was provided by another person?
In counselling, it is not uncommon for a counsellor to obtain information about the client that is provided to the counsellor by other persons, such as the client’s family or friends. Normally, this sort of third party information forms part of the counsellor’s clinical record for the client in question. However, in terms of providing the client access to that information, PIPA distinguishes between information that the client provides to the counsellor about him or herself and information about the client that is provided to the counsellor by third parties. Thus, a counsellor needs to carefully identify the source of the personal information about a client that may be requested by that client under PIPA.
Section 23(4)(d) of PIPA provides that a counsellor must not provide a client with personal information if "the disclosure [of that information] would reveal the identity of an individual who has provided personal information about another individual and the individual providing the personal information does not consent to disclosure of his or her identity." This wording provides the counsellor with a legal basis to refuse to give a client access to or a copy of third party information about the client unless that party’s identify is not revealed or that party consented to such disclosure.
This PIPA provision has consequences for clinical practice. For example, if a counsellor is collecting information about a client from a third party, the counsellor should ensure that that person understands and agrees (either before or at the time the information is collected) to one of two options. First, either the identity of the third party will not be revealed to the client without that person’s consent, or - alternatively - that the third party agrees in advance to allow such disclosure should the client make an access request in the future. Regardless of which agreement is established between the counsellor and the third party, the counsellor should document that agreement in clinical notes so that the counsellor has a record of the third party’s decision to refer to in the future.
Counsellors may find it useful to establish at the front of their clinical record a sheet that indicates which information about the client in the rest of the record was obtained from third parties, and – in particular – what conditions were attached to the possible future disclosure of that third party information. This would make it easier for the counsellor to identify the type of information that may be subject to the exception in section 23(4)(d) of PIPA, discussed above.
7) What if the records are kept only in electronic form on a computer?
Some counsellors may keep all or part of the information about their clients in clinical records stored in electronic form. As I noted in 2003, counsellors who follow this practice must ensure that they are able to produce a hard copy of the record when a client so requests. This advise has not changed as a result of PIPA.
On the other hand, PIPA now allows practitioners to charge a fee for accessing or searching the electronic record. So counsellors can charge a reasonable fee for the printing of electronic records, along the lines discussed above. As before, the specific fee should be set out in the counsellor’s policies and disclosed to the client in advance. Again, the A Counsellor’s Guide for Developing Client Personal Information Protection Policies and Procedures should be a useful source for such a document.
8) What if the counsellor no longer has control of or access to those records?
To answer this question, it is useful to differentiate between counsellors who may be employed by a private counselling agency and those who are self-employed counsellors,
In 2003, I gave the example of a counsellor who saw a client when that counsellor was employed by an agency, but is no longer working for that agency at the time of the client’s request. In such a situation, the agency and not the counsellor would mostly likely retain control over the client’s personal information. If this is the case, the counsellor should so inform the requesting client about how to contact the agency to ask for access to or a copy of those records. I then went on to explain that the issue of ownership of client records should be clearly addressed in any contract an agency establishes with counsellors who provide services to clients of that agency. PIPA does not change this advice.
Section 4(2) of PIPA states in effect that self-employed counsellors in private practice are responsible for the personal information that they collect from a client, including information that is no longer in their custody. (Again, if they were employed by an agency, the agency and not the counsellor would be responsible under PIPA or the earlier FOIPPA.) This means, therefore, that even if a sole practitioner no longer has direct control of or immediate access to his client’s clinical records – for example, the records that may be stored off-site, perhaps at a long-term record storage facility – that counsellor nonetheless remains responsible under PIPA for facilitating access to and copying that personal information.
As noted above, PIPA allows the counsellor to charge a fee to access or make copies of stored clinical information. Again, the specific access fees should be set out in the counsellor’s policies and disclosed to the client in advance.
9) How long should the counsellor keep the records so as to facilitate future access?
The PIPA requires a counsellor to keep a client’s personal information only for as long as it is necessary to fulfill the purpose(s) for which it was originally collected. The Act goes on to say that the counsellor should keep personal information that is used to make a decision about an individual for at least one year after using it so that the individual has a reasonable opportunity to later access to that information. In this respect, PIPA sets out a floor, not a ceiling.
While PIPA sets one year as the minimum retention period, as I explained in 2003, a counsellor should retain an adult client’s personal information for seven years from the date of the last recorded entry or seven years from the date that a minor client turned 19 years of age. This is to ensure that the counsellor has his or her clinical records at least to the end of the most common limitation period set for clients to initiate legal actions, plus one year for service of any writ, even if the counsellor is not being sued directly. Retaining this information for this long may provide the counsellor with access to useful information he or she may need if they are even involved in a legal proceeding concerning that client.
As I also noted previously, if a counsellor has a specific concern about how long to retain a clinical record for any particular client, the counsellor should consult with a lawyer before making a final decision and destroying the record in question.
Finally, PIPA requires counsellors to advise their clients on request about the their retention policies and how client records will be destroyed at the end of that period. Again, this information should be set out in the counsellor’s own policies and procedures document. The BCACC guideline can be a useful source of such information.
10) Can a counsellor deny the client access to the information in the records if such access could cause harm to the client or others?
As I noted above, there are some exceptions to the general rule in PIPA that requires a counsellor to provide access. In my earlier article on client access, I noted that, in the 1992 McInerney decision, the SCC identified potential harm to the client or others as a reason why a counsellor could refuse a client access to or a copy of a clinical record.
PIPA provides a similar exception, except that it is now stated as a duty that counsellors must follow in defined circumstances. This duty is framed in somewhat different language than that used in the SCC’s decision. Finally, the duty that a counsellor owes to a third party who may be at risk is markedly different than the duty that is owed to the requesting client. I will discuss those differences here, and provide some guidance on applying each test later.
Clause 23(4)(a) of PIPA states that a counsellor has a duty not to disclose personal information about a client if that disclosure "could reasonably be expected to threaten the safety or physical or mental health of an individual other than the individual who made the request." (Herein I will use the term "third party" instead of the phrasing "an individual other than the individual who made the request".)
The second access exception in clause 24(4)(b) states that a counsellor has a duty not to disclose personal information about a client if that disclosure "can reasonably be expected to cause immediate or grave harm to the safety or to the physical or mental health of the individual who made the request". (For the purposes of this update, I will presume that the "individual who made the request" is the client.)
These two PIPA provisions employ two different tests to activate the counsellor’s duty not to disclose personal information to the requesting client. Arguably, the first test (to protect third parties) sets a lower threshold than the second test (designed to protect the client). Specifically, the phrase "could reasonably be expected" in the first suggests a lower standard than "can reasonably be expected". Specifically, the word "can" indicates a more definitive finding of fact that the word "could".
Next, the type of risk being considered is lower in the first exception ("threaten the safety or physical or mental health") than in the second, where the risk must be expected "to cause immediate or grave harm to … safety or to the physical or mental health". Thus, a meaningful but not necessarily immediate or grave threat of harm to an identifiable third party would be sufficient to deny a client access to his or her personal information. However, before a counsellor could refuse access to a client because of harm that may befall that client, the anticipated disclosure must be capable of causing immediate harm, or (presumably) less imminent but grave or serious harm to the client. I will have more to say about these different tests below.
In the 1992 McInerney case, the Supreme Court of Canada did not distinguish between harm to third parties and harm to the requesting individual when it considered these exceptions to the general duty to disclose. At paragraph 36 the court stated: "Non-disclosure may be warranted if there is a real potential for harm either to the patient or to a third party. …In short, patients should have access to their medical records in all but a small number of circumstances. In the ordinary case, these records should be disclosed upon the request of the patient unless there is a significant likelihood of a substantial adverse effect on the physical, mental or emotional health of the patient or harm to a third party." [My emphasis.]
While this observation was obiter because the issue was not central to the court’s decision, the SCC’s discussion of the risk threshold test in the McInerney case did clearly indicate that the same risk assessment or test should be applied to both circumstances; i.e. when the harm may affect third parties or the requesting client. In contrast, the PIPA requirements clearly differentiate between these two situations, and place a lower threshold on the refusal to disclose if the harm could be caused to third parties than if the harm would effect the client alone.
Now, you ask, all this legal analysis may be interesting, but what practical significance does it have on my clinical practice? Well, instead of undertaking a more detailed analysis of risk along the lines that I suggested in my 2003 article in both situations, the PIPA now requires counsellors take different approaches for each situation. I will consider these separately next.
11) What factors should a counsellor consider before deciding that a client would be at risk if the client were given full access to his or her personal information?
While PIPA sets two different standards for triggering a counsellor’s duty to refuse disclosure to the requesting client, the type of factors that a counsellor should consider before deciding whether or not to refuse the client’s request for access that I outlined in the 2003 article would appear to be still applicable to this higher standard.
Before a counsellor can refuse the client access to the clinical records, the counsellor must first be able to prove– to quote clause 24(4)(b) again – that "the disclosure can reasonably be expected to cause immediate or grave harm to the safety or to the physical or mental health of the [requesting client]."
If a counsellor’s decision to act under clause 24(4)(b) was ever challenged in court, before a BCACC panel or before the Privacy Commissioner, the counsellor would want to ensure that he or she had good evidence to support that decision. There are three aspects of the threshold test in this clause that the counsellor should be prepared to answer with convincing evidence.
First, in relation to the phrase "can reasonably be expected to cause", the counsellor should determine if there is some direct link (i.e. some cause and effect) that can be drawn between the disclosure and the harm that might befall the client. This linkage should be supported by some objective and convincing evidence.
The counsellor should ask him or herself if it is more likely than not that reading the information in the clinical records would harm the client. Again, the word "can" used in this clause suggests there must be facts before the counsellor that make it clear that the harm would result. There would be less room for speculation under this test than the one concerning harm to third parties.
Before a court of law, a disciplinary panel or the Commissioner would conclude that a counsellor’s refusal to grant access was be justified, that reviewing authority would expect the counsellor to present convincing evidence that the harm would be real and substantial, and that it would more than likely happen as a result of the client reading the information. To quote from the SCC in McInerney, a denial of access "should not be exercised readily"; there should be "compelling grounds before confirming a decision to deny access".
Finally, the type of harm that is contemplated in clause 24(4)(b) appears to fall into two classes, although they do not appear to be mutually exclusive. First, there is harm that would be "immediate". The use of this word would suggest that the harm would have to immediately affect the safety or physical or mental health of the requesting client. This would suggest that if the disclosure would not lead to an immediate effect on the client, then - regardless of the potential severity of the harm - the counsellor is not then under a duty not to disclose.
Second, the harm could also be grave, in that it would have serious negative effects on the client’s safety, or physical or mental health. Thus, if the information to be disclosed would likely cause the client to become very upset or angry, this would probably not be a sufficient basis to trigger the counsellor’s duty not to disclose that information to the client. Similarly, recorded comments that are unflattering to the client should not be withheld.3 The sort of grave harm contemplated by this wording would appear to be circumstances when the client might inflict wounds on him or herself. Obviously a likely suicide would be included.
Finally, the counsellor’s analysis of the identified risks must be reasonable. In other words, the counsellor’s conclusion should be ones that an average person in similar circumstances with the same education and competencies would also likely reach.
12) What factors should a counsellor consider before deciding that a third party may be at risk if the requesting client is given full access to his or her personal information?
As noted above, the wording of clause 24(4)(b) suggests a lower threshold before the counsellor’s duty not to disclose would kick in. Before a counsellor can refuse the client access to the clinical records, the counsellor must first be able to prove that the requested disclosure "could reasonably be expected to threaten the safety or physical or mental health of [an third party]."
As for the previous test, the counsellor would still have to have good evidence to support his or her decision, but the type of information required is different here than in the other test.
The use of "could" in clause 24(4)(b) would appear to provide room for more speculation than was the case for the first test. Therefore, the test here would not be "more likely than not", but something less than that standard. For example, the use of could in this context could be interpreted as requiring the counsellor to male a "reasonable likely but not necessarily definitive conclusion based on the available information".
Next, there is no requirement as there was in the first test, that the potential harm to third parties be imminent. Presumably, the harm could be something that could take place some time in the near future or beyond.
Finally, the type of harm does not have to be "grave" as was the case in the first test. Some possible threat of harm to the third party’s safety or physical or mental health would appear to be sufficient. Thus, it may be possible that the counsellor would be justified in refusing to release the client’s personal information to the client if family members or friends could face some possible threat of harm to their safety, even if it was not grave or serious harm. Unfortunately, the degree of possible harm is not clearly expressed in this section of PIPA, so the counsellor will have to balance the third party’s right not to be subjected to some possible but not grave harm against the client’s right to access his or her personal information, regardless of source.
I would also suggest that a counsellor should either be able to name a third party who may possibly be subjected to the harm, or at least be able to identify a class of persons who could be at some risk. If it were not possible for the counsellor to name or identify potential victims of the requesting client, the counsellor would not have a duty to refuse to disclose.
13) If the counsellor concludes that there could be or is a risk of harm to third parties or to the client, is there something else the counsellor should do before refusing the client’s request for access?
If a counsellor has reason to believe that harm will result to the client or others from the client reading the clinical notes, there is a further step that should be taken.
Before access or copying is denied, section 23(5) requires the counsellor to sever or block-out the problematic information in the clinical records and then allow the requesting client access to the remaining information. It would be a rare situation when all the information in the clinical records would met the threshold tests set out above so as to justify a refusal to access the entire record.
14) Can access be denied until the counsellor discusses the information in the records with the client?
PIPA does not provide a direct answer to this question. As I noted in the previous article on access, a counsellor cannot make it a pre-condition to providing access that he or she must be allowed to explain the information in the records to the client. A counsellor can offer to provide such an explanation and on such terms as the counsellor and client can agree. And a reasonable fee can be charged for this service, but only if the client requests or agrees to this separate service. But - to repeat - the counsellor cannot deny access until he or she can discuss the information with the client. That said, the exceptions discussed above might nonetheless apply.
15) What happens if a client disagrees with the information the counsellor has put in the clinical record?
The common law did not address this question, but section 24 of PIPA speaks to the client’s right to request corrections to his or her personal information.
Section 24(1) allows a client to request a counsellor to correct what the client believes is an error or omission in the clinical records. Such a request could be made "blind" or it could be made after the client reviewed the record or received a copy, as discussed above.
Section 24(2) requires the counsellor to make the correction the client requests if the counsellor is "satisfied on reasonable grounds that the request … should be implemented." (This section goes on to requires the counsellor to send the corrected information to others who may have received previously the incorrect information.)
Section 24(3) allows a counsellor not to make the requested correction. However, reflecting the wording in section 24(2), the counsellor can only refuse to make the requested correction if he or she is satisfied on reasonable grounds that that request should not be implemented. Instead, the counsellor must then annotate the record indicating that the request was received but the correction was not made.
This section seems to strike a reasonable balance between the client’s right to correct what the client believes is incorrect information, and the counsellor’s right to record information about the client based on the counsellor’s observations and investigations, including any conclusions or commentary about the client.
16) What happens if a public body that is itself covered under the FOIPOP Act employs the counsellor?
As noted above, if an agency or organization is subject to the FOIPOP Act and employs the counsellor, the clinical records would be subject to disclosure under that legislation not PIPA. Indeed, this older legislation contains a provision that allows a public body to refuse to disclose information to a person if that disclosure could reasonably harm anyone’s safety, or mental or physical health.
The law concerning the application of BC’s freedom of information legislation in the public sector is more than can be reasonably summarized in this article. If a counsellor believes that his or her employer or agency may be subject to this legislation rather than PIPA, the counsellor should discuss the legislated rules of access with the employer so that those requirements are understood by all concerned. Depending on the counsellor’s circumstances, this may require the employer or agency to retain counsel to obtain independent legal advice.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The PIPA requirements concerning access to clinical records is a good example of when government legislation provides further guidance to a common law rule that was established previously by the courts. Counsellors are advised to read and understand these new provisions, because access requests are not uncommon in clinical practice. Indeed, as I have noted throughout, because PIPA requires counsellors to have their own personal information protection policies and procedures, such a document should explain the basic steps concerning what the counsellor will do when a client asks for access. The new Counsellor’s Guide for Developing Client Personal Information Protection Policies and Procedures posted at the BCACC website should provide useful guidance on this and other related topics.
POSTCRIPT/DISCLAIMER
This update is intended to help clinical counsellors gain a better understanding of legal issues that are relevant to their practice. It is not meant to be a substitute for independent legal advice in any particular situation. If a counsellor has a particular concern about an issue the counsellor is facing in his or her practice, the counsellor should seek specific advice from a lawyer. Neither the BCACC nor its legal counsel can provide legal advice to individual counsellors.
[1] McInerney v. MacDonald [1992] 2 S.C.R. 138, 137 N.R. 35, 7 C.P.C. (3d) 269, 12 C.C.L.T. (2d) 255, [1992] S.C.J. No. 57 (S.C.C.).
[2] Counsellors who are employed by an agency or organization would generally be expected to follow their employer’s rules governing personal information protection, be those rules required by PIPA or the earlier Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. See my two-part PIPA article for more details on these distinctions.
[3] Kujath v. Kujath [1994] A. J. No. 1254 (Alta QB).
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